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Since the late 1950s, nutrition experts have debated whether foods enriched with micronutrients such as protein could alleviate world hunger. Industrial production of such ›wonder foods‹ began in the 1960s, making the food industry an actor in international food aid. Following a brief review of the history of scientific nutrition research, the article analyzes the first boom of fortified foods between the 1950s and the 1970s. With particular reference to the NGO CARE and the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) with its product Incaparina, it shows how the conflict-ridden cooperation between humanitarian actors, governments, business and science developed. In addition to looking at contemporary debates about prices, quality controls and marketing strategies, consumer perspectives must be considered in order to understand the success or failure of new products. After a temporary slump in euphoria from the 1970s onwards, ›wonder foods‹ have experienced a revival since the 1990s – mainly because the networks between governments, nutrition experts, international organizations and the food industry were further cultivated and greater consideration was given to the needs of consumers.
Seit den späten 1950er-Jahren diskutierten ErnährungsexpertInnen, ob mit Mikronährstoffen wie Protein angereicherte Nahrungsmittel den Hunger auf der Welt lindern könnten. Die industrielle Produktion solcher »Wonder Foods« begann in den 1960er-Jahren. Damit wurde die Lebensmittelindustrie zu einem Akteur in der internationalen Nahrungsmittelhilfe. Nach einem kurzen Rückblick auf die Geschichte wissenschaftlicher Ernährungsforschung analysiert der Aufsatz den ersten Boom angereicherter Nahrungsmittel zwischen den 1950er- und den 1970er-Jahren. Am Beispiel der NGO CARE und des zentralamerikanischen Ernährungsinstituts INCAP mit seinem Produkt »Incaparina« wird gezeigt, wie sich die konfliktreiche Kooperation zwischen humanitären Akteuren, Regierungen, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft entwickelte. Neben dem Blick auf zeitgenössische Debatten über Preise, Qualitätskontrollen und Marketingstrategien müssen insbesondere KonsumentInnenperspektiven einbezogen werden, um Erfolg oder Scheitern neuer Produkte zu verstehen. Nach einem temporären Einbruch der Euphorie ab den 1970er-Jahren erlebten »Wonder Foods« seit den 1990er-Jahren ein Revival – vor allem deshalb, weil die Netzwerke zwischen Regierungen, ErnährungsexpertInnen, internationalen Organisationen und Lebensmittelindustrie weiter gepflegt wurden und die Bedürfnisse von KonsumentInnen mehr Berücksichtigung fanden.
By the late 1970s, it was technologically possible to manufacture microcomputers – very small, stand-alone computers for personal use – in very large quantities. Selling them, however, meant creating a mass market where none existed: conventionally, only trained professionals, and a few devoted enthusiasts, interacted directly with the machines. Designers, marketers, retailers and other promoters therefore sought to build meanings into the design and presentation of computers which would connect them with new audiences. Such meanings reflected – and might themselves modify – the prevalent hopes, fears, desires and expectations of the users’ cultures.
Theory matters. Most historians would probably agree with this postulate, in the sense that theories from disciplines such as sociology, economics or psychology can sharpen historical analyses of any topic (though many of them may prefer quite pragmatic, common-sense approaches in their own empirical studies). But when it comes to a historical understanding of a phenomenon like marketization, theory does remain an analytical resource – and at the same time turns into a multifaceted object of research. The way we think about markets is highly affected by theorists, and not only by their ideas but also by their effectiveness in making them influential over specific periods of time.
Milton Friedman hung up the phone in disgruntlement. The most influential economist of the postwar era had just called three different banks, one in Chicago and then two in New York, in order to initiate a financial transaction. He wanted to sell short $300,000 in pound sterling. Short selling is a technique for speculating on falling prices. Initially, speculators can only speculate on rising prices: they buy something and hope that it gains value, so that they can sell it at a profit. If the price for this asset goes down instead, the speculator incurs a loss when he resells it. So in order to profit from falling prices, speculators need to sell first and buy later – which is indeed possible if what is sold now is in fact only to be delivered a few weeks later. If the speculator is right and prices fall in the interim, he can buy cheap just before delivery is due and thus profit from having already sold what, at the time, he had not yet owned.