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During the first five-year plan, the Soviet state turned to an unusual source to cope with the challenge of factory-induced deafness and disability: the deaf community. From 1930 to 1937, deaf activists, alongside specialist doctors, organised a yearly, three-day event known as Beregi slukh! (Take Care of Your Hearing!) to propagandise the prevention of deafness. During these years, more than 46,600 lectures were held in venues across the Soviet Union and 7,900,000 brochures, leaflets and posters printed. While the event reflected the Soviet belief that disability was a relic of the ›backward‹ past that would be eliminated as communism approached, the deaf activists involved in these events used them to make the alternative case for their own identity as a legitimate part of the Soviet body politic. By foregrounding their labour capacities and demonstrating aspects of deaf cultural practices (including sign language) to a hearing audience, Beregi slukh! became a powerful means to advocate for the centrality of the deaf community to Soviet visions of self and society.
Während des ersten Fünfjahresplans griff der sowjetische Staat auf eine ungewöhnliche Ressource zurück, um das Problem der fabrikbedingten Taubheit und Behinderung zu bewältigen: die Gehörlosengemeinschaft. Von 1930 bis 1937 organisierten Gehörlosenaktivist:innen zusammen mit Fachärzt:innen jährlich eine dreitägige Veranstaltung mit dem Titel Beregi slukh! (»Schützen Sie Ihr Gehör!«), um für die Prävention von Gehörlosigkeit zu werben. In diesen Jahren wurden in der gesamten Sowjetunion mehr als 46.600 Vorträge gehalten sowie 7.900.000 Broschüren, Faltblätter und Poster gedruckt. Während die Veranstaltung die sowjetische Überzeugung widerspiegelte, dass Behinderung ein Relikt der »rückständigen« Vergangenheit sei und mit dem Herannahen des Kommunismus beseitigt werden würde, nutzten die gehörlosen Aktivist:innen das Ereignis, um ihre eigene Identität als legitimen Teil der sowjetischen Gesellschaft zu verteidigen. Indem sie ihre Arbeitskraft in den Vordergrund stellten und einem hörenden Publikum Aspekte ihrer kulturellen Praktiken demonstrierten (einschließlich der Gebärdensprache), wurde Beregi slukh! zu einem wirkungsvollen Mittel, um die Relevanz der Gehörlosengemeinschaft für die sowjetischen Visionen des Selbst und der Gesellschaft zu betonen.
Picture agencies are mediators between photographers and editorial staffs; they play a crucial role in producing mass media visibility. However, their part in the system of the visual propaganda of the Nazi state is largely unexplored. This article features a controversial case, the American Associated Press and its German subsidiary. By submitting to the Schriftleitergesetz (Editorial Control Law) in 1935, the German AP GmbH (LLC) followed its German counterparts in the process of Gleichschaltung (forcible coordination). Until the United States entered the war in December 1941, AP supplied the Nazi press with American pictures. This service proved to be of particular relevance for propaganda. AP was also allowed to continue its photographic reporting in the Reich. AP pictures taken under the aegis of the Propaganda Ministry, the Wehrmacht and the SS were ubiquitous in the Nazi press. Moreover, the New York headquarters supplied the North American press with these same pictures, where they were published either as news photos or as propaganda images.
Milton Friedman hung up the phone in disgruntlement. The most influential economist of the postwar era had just called three different banks, one in Chicago and then two in New York, in order to initiate a financial transaction. He wanted to sell short $300,000 in pound sterling. Short selling is a technique for speculating on falling prices. Initially, speculators can only speculate on rising prices: they buy something and hope that it gains value, so that they can sell it at a profit. If the price for this asset goes down instead, the speculator incurs a loss when he resells it. So in order to profit from falling prices, speculators need to sell first and buy later – which is indeed possible if what is sold now is in fact only to be delivered a few weeks later. If the speculator is right and prices fall in the interim, he can buy cheap just before delivery is due and thus profit from having already sold what, at the time, he had not yet owned.
How will Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine end? What kinds of political scenarios could stop the suffering and bring stability to the region? Of all the different future scenarios none is particularly encouraging. In particular, the prospect of a ›Finlandized‹ Ukraine has met with near universal rejection. Yet, ever since Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimea, ›Finlandization‹ of Ukraine has been discussed as a potential solution.
Theory matters. Most historians would probably agree with this postulate, in the sense that theories from disciplines such as sociology, economics or psychology can sharpen historical analyses of any topic (though many of them may prefer quite pragmatic, common-sense approaches in their own empirical studies). But when it comes to a historical understanding of a phenomenon like marketization, theory does remain an analytical resource – and at the same time turns into a multifaceted object of research. The way we think about markets is highly affected by theorists, and not only by their ideas but also by their effectiveness in making them influential over specific periods of time.
What is the link between consumer society, fear of a nuclear war, design, modernity and utopia? According to the curators David Crowley and Jane Pavitt, the answer can be summarized in one concept: the Cold War. ‘Cold War Modern’ is an exhibit intending to show how the two postwar superpowers, the US and the USSR, engaged in aggressive contests in art, architecture and design in order to ‘demonstrate a superior vision of modernity’.
Three processes provided a dynamic of violence that involved the whole continent of Europe in varying degrees. First, “total war” meant the escalation of violence applied to the entire population of enemy states. Second, “totalitarian” ideologies drew on the experience of war and sought to annihilate their own projected antagonists. Third, the tension between territory, peoples, and nation-states was resolved through ethnic violence. The worst episodes of violence, especially the Holocaust, combined all three processes. Democratic states were affected by the same violence but to a much lesser extent, due to inbuilt restraints. Determining whether this dynamic of violence was distinctively European or one dimension of a wider modernity means rethinking European history in a global historical context.
While most Europeans lived through an exceptionally peaceful period of history, termed ‘The Long Peace’ by John Lewis Gaddis,2 the populations of other continents were decidedly less fortunate. What was a ‘Cold War’ for the Europeans was anything but ‘cold’ for the Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, for most Arab peoples, the Afghans, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians, the populations of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, and of most of Latin America. How, then, can one be so sanguine as to characterise this period as that of a ‘Cold War’ or a ‘long peace’? The reason is that the long-expected Third World War has not (yet?) taken place. It was the prospect of such a Third World War, a ‘total’ and in all probability nuclear war, that attracted the attention of concerned minds in Europe and North America, the cultures that over centuries produced most publications on the subjects of war, strategy, military affairs and international relations.
“Silent Dust”, released in February 1949, was one of a group of films that explored the problems of the returning Second World War veteran. Although the maladjusted veteran is a feature of all major wars, it assumes an added significance in this instance because the Second World War, in Britain and America at least, is conventionally understood “almost universally as honourable and noble, fought with right and justice exclusively on the Allied side”. Angus Calder has argued that the dominant narrative constructed about the Second World War in Britain was what he terms the “myth of the Blitz”, a heroic myth of courage, endurance and pulling together. This myth, through its perpetuation in an enormous array of cultural practices - notably a cycle of combat films in the 1950s such as “The Dam Busters” (1955) and “Reach for the Sky” (1956) - became the accepted view and was almost impossible to dislodge. It was a myth that was officially ratified in the British state’s commemoration of the war and, like all dominant discourses, served to marginalise alternative constructions of the conflict, particularly those that represent it as a traumatic and possibly brutalising experience. By analysing “Silent Dust” in detail and in relation to its social and cultural context, I hope to recover this repressed narrative and restore it to its rightful place as an important discourse about the Second World War.
This article investigates the little known phenomenon of tourism to the Iron Curtain, using the example of the inter-German border. The practice of traveling to the demarcation line to see where Germany and Europe were divided peaked during the mid-1960s but was already in full swing by the mid-1950s and lasted until the fall of the border in 1989. Based on archival documents, postcards and tourist guidebooks, the article analyses the growth of a tourist infrastructure on the western side of the inter-German border and situates this travel as a form of ‘dark tourism’. It argues that seeing the border and visualising the partition of the country did little for overcoming it but rather tended to underwrite the political and territorial status quo. In the Cold War battle for public opinion, seeing the border allowed West Germans and their visitors from abroad to juxtapose freedom and prosperity with captivity and decay, thus advertising the superiority of the capitalist model over its socialist other.