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My Road to Berlin, or Mein Weg nach Berlin, presents a Willy Brandt that confounds a present-day reader’s expectations. While the 1960 autobiography of the then-mayor of West Berlin links his career with the familiar story of democracy’s development in Germany, this work nevertheless retains an unexpected edge. In one surprising scene, the mayor denounces his East Berlin SED counterparts as a ›Communist foreign legion‹ whom ›the citizens of my city had decisively defeated‹ during the Second Berlin Crisis of 1958 (p. 17). In the book, Brandt comes off as a Cold Warrior of steely determination rather than a Brückenbauer bridging ideological divides. Far from being out of character, however, My Road to Berlin captures Brandt at a pivotal moment in his career, when he sought to offer himself to both West German voters and a global public as a viable alternative to Konrad Adenauer.
How will Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine end? What kinds of political scenarios could stop the suffering and bring stability to the region? Of all the different future scenarios none is particularly encouraging. In particular, the prospect of a ›Finlandized‹ Ukraine has met with near universal rejection. Yet, ever since Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimea, ›Finlandization‹ of Ukraine has been discussed as a potential solution.
The first thesis the paper argues is that a certain collective identity emerged at the shop floor („we“, the workers as opposed to „them“, party leaders, intelligentsia, peasants, the self-employed) that was built - and declared - increasingly in opposition to the official ideology and the communist party.5 Important factors in this process were the growing economic difficulties, the party’s apparent inability to solve them and the increasing materialism people experienced in the everyday life - including party member- and leadership. From the mid-70s onwards, the workers could perceive the worsening economic situation of the country by the decrease of the real wages and the need to do overwork or take extra jobs (first in the agriculture and then in the so-called vgmk-s) to keep the former standards of living. The continuously increasing prices made the impact of the „global market“ real regardless of the stance of the Central Committee. The sharpening criticism of the system is formulated, however, not from the viewpoint of the individual but that of the worker, which suggests the existence of a collective identity. One may call it a paradox of the Communist ideology that the system, after all, was successful to develop working-class collective identities but these were built in opposition to the Communist regime and not for it. The paper will attempt to show how these „oppositionist“ identities were formulated and in what ways they are indicative of the alienation of the workers from the workers’ state.
Milton Friedman hung up the phone in disgruntlement. The most influential economist of the postwar era had just called three different banks, one in Chicago and then two in New York, in order to initiate a financial transaction. He wanted to sell short $300,000 in pound sterling. Short selling is a technique for speculating on falling prices. Initially, speculators can only speculate on rising prices: they buy something and hope that it gains value, so that they can sell it at a profit. If the price for this asset goes down instead, the speculator incurs a loss when he resells it. So in order to profit from falling prices, speculators need to sell first and buy later – which is indeed possible if what is sold now is in fact only to be delivered a few weeks later. If the speculator is right and prices fall in the interim, he can buy cheap just before delivery is due and thus profit from having already sold what, at the time, he had not yet owned.
Picture agencies are mediators between photographers and editorial staffs; they play a crucial role in producing mass media visibility. However, their part in the system of the visual propaganda of the Nazi state is largely unexplored. This article features a controversial case, the American Associated Press and its German subsidiary. By submitting to the Schriftleitergesetz (Editorial Control Law) in 1935, the German AP GmbH (LLC) followed its German counterparts in the process of Gleichschaltung (forcible coordination). Until the United States entered the war in December 1941, AP supplied the Nazi press with American pictures. This service proved to be of particular relevance for propaganda. AP was also allowed to continue its photographic reporting in the Reich. AP pictures taken under the aegis of the Propaganda Ministry, the Wehrmacht and the SS were ubiquitous in the Nazi press. Moreover, the New York headquarters supplied the North American press with these same pictures, where they were published either as news photos or as propaganda images.
During the first five-year plan, the Soviet state turned to an unusual source to cope with the challenge of factory-induced deafness and disability: the deaf community. From 1930 to 1937, deaf activists, alongside specialist doctors, organised a yearly, three-day event known as Beregi slukh! (Take Care of Your Hearing!) to propagandise the prevention of deafness. During these years, more than 46,600 lectures were held in venues across the Soviet Union and 7,900,000 brochures, leaflets and posters printed. While the event reflected the Soviet belief that disability was a relic of the ›backward‹ past that would be eliminated as communism approached, the deaf activists involved in these events used them to make the alternative case for their own identity as a legitimate part of the Soviet body politic. By foregrounding their labour capacities and demonstrating aspects of deaf cultural practices (including sign language) to a hearing audience, Beregi slukh! became a powerful means to advocate for the centrality of the deaf community to Soviet visions of self and society.
Während des ersten Fünfjahresplans griff der sowjetische Staat auf eine ungewöhnliche Ressource zurück, um das Problem der fabrikbedingten Taubheit und Behinderung zu bewältigen: die Gehörlosengemeinschaft. Von 1930 bis 1937 organisierten Gehörlosenaktivist:innen zusammen mit Fachärzt:innen jährlich eine dreitägige Veranstaltung mit dem Titel Beregi slukh! (»Schützen Sie Ihr Gehör!«), um für die Prävention von Gehörlosigkeit zu werben. In diesen Jahren wurden in der gesamten Sowjetunion mehr als 46.600 Vorträge gehalten sowie 7.900.000 Broschüren, Faltblätter und Poster gedruckt. Während die Veranstaltung die sowjetische Überzeugung widerspiegelte, dass Behinderung ein Relikt der »rückständigen« Vergangenheit sei und mit dem Herannahen des Kommunismus beseitigt werden würde, nutzten die gehörlosen Aktivist:innen das Ereignis, um ihre eigene Identität als legitimen Teil der sowjetischen Gesellschaft zu verteidigen. Indem sie ihre Arbeitskraft in den Vordergrund stellten und einem hörenden Publikum Aspekte ihrer kulturellen Praktiken demonstrierten (einschließlich der Gebärdensprache), wurde Beregi slukh! zu einem wirkungsvollen Mittel, um die Relevanz der Gehörlosengemeinschaft für die sowjetischen Visionen des Selbst und der Gesellschaft zu betonen.
It is difficult to state conclusively whether the German revolution of 1848 was a success or a failure. I take a more sceptical view of the positive consequences of this revolution view than many recenbt historians of the period, at least in Germany. In order to explain and substantiate this position, I will begin by outlining a few theses taking a closer look at the character of the German revolution of 1848 and its social and political base. Then I shall discuss the question of the 'success or failure of the revolution' and the long-term effects of the events and developments of the year 1848. In the following I shall concentrate primarily on Prussia as the centre of the later German
Empire, and I shall focus particularly on the situation in the cities.
In this article I examine the context for the British bank Barclays’ decision to disinvest from South Africa in 1986, with special attention to the impact of the Anti-Apartheid Movement’s campaign against the bank. The 18-year long campaign against Barclays – the largest bank in South Africa at the time and the fourth largest foreign-owned corporation – points to significant developments within the fields of corporate social responsibility and the potential influence of social movements on multinational corporations. Applying the theoretical approach of subpolitics as developed by Ulrich Beck in combination with the later subdivision by Boris Holzer and Mads P. Sørensen into a passive and an active form, it is possible to analyse the decisions of both anti-apartheid activists and Barclays on similar terms. The conclusions drawn in this article emphasise the idea that economic decisions taken by multinational corporations may have unintended political consequences and, furthermore, that the awareness of this phenomenon has contributed to the development of corporate social responsibility. Finally, I suggest that the campaign against Barclays generated public attentiveness towards the social responsibility of businesses.
In den ungarischen Wochenschauen der 1950er-Jahre, »diesen kurzen Propagandafilmen«, wie der ungarische Filmemacher Sándor Buglya schreibt, »sind nur die Bilder wahr. Was aber durch die Filme, die vorgetragenen Dialoge und den Kommentar präsentiert wird, ist eine ständige Lüge. Und natürlich tost ununterbrochen der Beifall. Die Kamera verstellt die Wahrheit, sie gaukelt wirklichkeitsferne Illusion vor.« Nun könnte man darüber streiten, was »wahre Bilder« sind. Entscheidend jedoch ist Buglyas Hinweis, dass jegliche Art von Film, sei es ein Dokumentar-, Wochenschau- oder Spielfilm, die vorfilmische Realität verändert. Buglya schildert, wie in ausländischen und Budapester Wochenschauberichten nahezu dasselbe Bildmaterial verwendet, jedoch mit einander entgegengesetztem Kommentar ausgestrahlt wurde: Während erstere (im Blick auf das Jahr 1956) die Ereignisse eines Volksaufstandes dokumentierten, galten für letztere dieselben Bilder als Beleg einer Konterrevolution. Der Dokumentarfilm, so Buglya, sei kein Abbild des Realen, sondern spiegele mehr oder weniger genau das Verhältnis des Regisseurs zur Wirklichkeit.